segunda-feira, 17 de setembro de 2012
Crise do Direito nos Estados Unidos
Direito nos EUA atravessa uma das suas maiores crises
Setor vive perda de vagas, e recém-formados não obtêm emprego; situação se agravou após turbulência financeira
Maior escritório do país faliu em maio; em carta, diretor do curso de direito em Columbia alerta para dificuldades
RAUL JUSTE LORES
DE NOVA YORK
A quantidade de recém-formados em direito que conseguem um emprego na área nos EUA é a menor dos últimos 25 anos. O maior escritório de advocacia dos EUA faliu em maio, e o diretor da Faculdade de Direito de Columbia publicou uma carta aberta aos alunos alertando para as dificuldades pós-diploma.
Os advogados americanos continuam a ter superpoderes e muito glamour nos filmes de Hollywood, mas a profissão atravessa uma das maiores crises de sua história no país.
Na década passada, cerca de 85% dos recém-formados conseguiam emprego na área. Em 2010, 68%. Da turma que se formou em junho de 2011, apenas 55% acharam colocação até nove meses depois da formatura.
A crise econômica iniciada em 2008 tem grande responsabilidade no desempenho do setor, que já sofria com o inflacionamento de bônus e salários de advogados após a fusão de grandes escritórios e com o achatamento do salário inicial para os novatos.
Sob corte de gastos, grandes empresas passaram a contar mais com seus próprios advogados ou a exigir valores cada vez menores ao recorrer aos escritórios no mercado.
Segundo pesquisa da Universidade Northwestern, 15 mil empregos nos maiores escritórios de advocacia desapareceram em quatro anos.
No final de maio, foi decretada a falência do maior escritório americano, Dewey LeBoeuf, que tinha 1.400 advogados e uma dívida de US$ 315 milhões.
No ano passado, o escritório Howrey, de Washington, com 500 advogados, também declarou falência.
Mas o número de recém-formados é de 43 mil por ano. Em 20 anos, 26 novas faculdades de direito foram abertas. Cerca de 90% desses recém-formados têm uma dívida de crédito estudantil acima de US$ 98 mil (R$ 197 mil). O desemprego amplia a possibilidade de calote -nos EUA, o total das dívidas com crédito estudantil chega a US$ 1 bilhão (R$ 2 bilhões).
"A faculdade de direito é muito lucrativa porque, em vários casos, só depende de professor e giz, e formamos muito mais gente do que nosso mercado de trabalho consegue absorver", disse à Folha o professor William Henderson, da Universidade Indiana, que fez um trabalho sobre a crise das faculdades com a American Bar Association, a OAB local.
"O negócio jurídico ainda movimenta quase US$ 400 bilhões neste país, mas ele não tem crescido, o que dificulta a entrada dos mais jovens", explica.
Mesmo na Universidade Columbia, uma das melhores do país, o baque foi sentido. Na turma de 2011, 74% dos alunos do segundo ano conseguiram estágio, contra 92% no ano anterior.
Em carta aberta aos alunos, o diretor do curso de direito de Columbia, David Schizer, diz que "nossos estudantes estão encarando um mercado apertado como nunca antes".
quinta-feira, 13 de setembro de 2012
domingo, 9 de setembro de 2012
Contramaritário e o Larry Soum blog
September 09, 2012
Legal Theory Lexicon: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
Introduction
The counter-majoritarian difficulty may be the best known problem in constitutional theory. The phrase is attributed to Alexander Bickel—a Yale Law School Professor—who is said to have introduced it in his famous book The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. Whatever Bickel actually meant by the phrase, it has now taken on a life of its own. The counter-majoritarian difficulty states a problem with the legitimacy of the institution of judicial review: when unelected judges use the power of judicial review to nullify the actions of electedexecutives or legislators, they act contrary to “majority will” as expressed by representative institutions. If one believes that democratic majoritarianism is a very great political value, then this feature of judicial review is problematic. For at least two or three decades after Bickel’s naming of this problem, it dominated constitutional theory.
This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon explores the counter-majoritarian difficulty, efforts to solve the problem and to dissolve it. As always, the Lexicon is aimed at law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory. As is frequently the case with the Lexicon, we will explore a very big topic in just a few paragraphs. Many articles and books have been written about the counter-majoritarian difficulty; we will only scratch its surface. Moreover, any really deep discussion of the counter-majoritarian difficulty would lead (sooner or later) to almost every other topic in constitutional theory. The Lexicon is “quick and dirty,” and definitely not deep, comprehensive, or authoritative.
Democracy and Majoritarianism
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is rooted in ideas about the relationship between democracy and legitimacy (see the Legal Theory Lexicon entry on Legitimacy ). We all know the basic story: the actions of government are legitimate because of their democratic pedigree, and democratic legitimacy requires “majority rule.” Of course, it isn’t that simple. Among the complexities are the following:
There are many different theories of democratic legitimacy, and only some of them emphasize “majoritarianism” as the key factor.
Some theories of democratic legitimacy rely on the idea of “consent of the governed,” but it is very difficult to mount an argument for actual consent to existing majoritarian institutions or their actions.
The idea of “legitimacy” is itself deeply controversial and might even be called obscure. What legitimacy is and why it is important are themselves deep and controversial questions.
Despite these complexities, most of us have a rough and ready appreciation for the idea that actions by democratic majorities have some kind of legitimacy that is lacking in the actions of unelected judges. At any rate, that idea is the normative foundation of the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Constitutional Limits on Majoritarianism
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is sometimes characterized as a problem with the institution of judicial review, but it could also be understood as a difficulty for any constitution that constrains majority will. Of course, there could be constitutions that impose no limits at all on the will of democratically elected legislatures. For example, a regime of unicameral parliamentary supremacy might be said to have a constitution that allows a parliamentary majority to pass any legislation that it pleases and to override the courts or executive whenever the legislature is in disagreement with their actions. Of course, even this simple constitution might constrain the legislature in a certain sense. Legislation that attempts to constrain the action of a future legislature might be “unconstitutional.” Another example might be legislation that abolishes elections and substitutes a system of self-perpetuating appointments. Similarly, a legislature might pass a “bill of rights” that purports to bind future legislatures, even in the absence of an institution of judicial review.
The Institution of Judicial Review
Even though the counter-majoritarian difficulty might be a feature of any system with a binding constitution, the difficulty is especially acute for a regime that incorporates the institution of judicial review incorporating judicial supremacy. In the United States, for example, the courts have the power to declare that acts of Congress are unconstitutional, and if the Supreme Court so declares, the Congress does not have the power to override its decision.
The institution of judicial review is counter-majoritarian in part because federal judges are not elected and they serve life terms. Presidents are elected every four years; members of the House of Representatives every two years; and Senators serve staggered six year terms. Of course, judges and justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and these features create some degree of democratic control of the judiciary. Nonetheless, on the surface, it certainly looks like judicial review is an antidemocratic institution. Unelected judges strike down legislation enacted by elected legislators: that is certainly antidemocratic and antimajoritarian in some sense.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is compounded by the nature of judicial review as it has been practiced by the modern Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court limited itself to enforcing the separation of powers between the President and Congress or to the enforcement of the relatively determinate provisions of the constitution that establish the “rules of the game” for the political branches, then the counter-majoritarian difficulty might not amount to much. But the modern Supreme Court has been involved in the enforcement of constitutional provisions that general, abstract, and seemingly value laden—examples include the freedom of speech, the equal protection clause, and the due process clause of the constitution. The counter-majoritarian difficulty seems particularly acute when it comes to so-called “implied fundamental rights,” like the right to privacy at issue in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.
Judicial review in the United States includes judicial supremacy--the Supreme Court has the final say on the issues it decides, but this is not the only way that judicial review could be structured. In Canada, for example, provisions is made for a legislative override of the decisions striking down legislation. Such provisions ameliorate the counter-majoritarian difficulty, even if the override is rarely exercised, because they provide democratic control. Of course, even in the United States a Supreme Court decision can be overridden by a constitutional amendment, but that requires a supermajority.
Answering the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
How have constitutional theorists attempted to answer the counter-majoritarian difficulty? The problem with answer that question is that there are so many answers that it is difficult to single out three or four for illustrative purposes. So remember, the “answers” that are discussed here are arbitrary selections from a much longer list.
Discrete and Insular Minorities One famous answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty focuses on the idea of “discrete and insular minorities.” The background to this answer is the premise that in the long run, most individuals win some and lose some in the process of democratic decision making. Shifting coalitions among various interest groups “spread the wealth” and the pain—no one wins all the time or loses all the time. Or rather, normally wins and losses are spread across the many different groups that constitute a given political society. However, there may be some groups that are excluded from the give and take of democratic politics. Some groups may be so unpopular (or the victims of such extreme prejudice) that they almost always are the losers in the democratic process. The famous “Footnote Four” of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the Carolene Products case can serve as the germ of an answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Judicial review is arguably legitimate when it serves to protect the interests of “discrete and insular minorities” against oppressive actions by democratic majorities.
Anti-Democratic Political Theory Another answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty admits that judicial review is antidemocratic but seeks to justify this feature by appeal to some value that trumps democratic legitimacy. This isn’t really just one answer to the difficulty—it is a whole lot of answers that share a common feature—the appeal to anti-democratic political values. For example, it might be argued that “liberty” is a higher value than “democracy” and hence that judicial review to protect liberty is justified. Or it might be argued that “equality” is a higher value, or “privacy,” or something else. Obviously, there is a lot more to be said about this kind of answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, but for the purposes of this Lexicon entry, this incredibly terse explanation will have to suffice.
Dualism and High Politics Yet a third approach to the counter-majoritarian difficulty attempts to turn the problem upside down—arguing that judicial review is actually a democratic institution that checks the antidemocratic actions of elected officials. Whoa Nelly! How does that work? This third approach is strongly associated with the work of Bruce Ackerman—perhaps the most influential constitutional theorist since Alexander Bickel. Ackerman’s views deserve at least a whole Lexicon entry, but the gist of his theory can be stated briefly. Ackerman argues for a view that can be called “dualism,” because it distinguishes between two kinds of politics—“ordinary politics” (the kind practiced every day by legislators and bureaucrats) and “constitutional politics.” What is “constitutional politics”? And how is it different from “ordinary politics”? Ackerman’s answers to these questions begin with the idea that ordinary politics isn’t very democratic. Why not? We all know the answer to that question. Ordinary politics are dominated by self-interested politicians and manipulative special interest groups. The people (or “We the People” as Ackerman likes to say) don’t really get involved in ordinary politics, and therefore, ordinary politics are not really very democratic. Constitutional politics, by way of contrast, involve extraordinary issues that actually “get the attention” of the people. For example, the ratification of the Constitution of 1789 caught the attention of ordinary citizens, as did the Reconstruction Amendments (the 13th, 14th, and 15th) following the Civil War. When “We the People” become engaged in constitutional politics, we are giving commands to our agents—Congress and the President—and the Courts are merely enforcing our will when they engaged in judicial review—so long as they are faithful to our commands.
Ackerman’s theory emphasized the idea of distinct regimes that resulted from “constitutional moments”—periods of intense popular involvement in constitutional politics. Recently, Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have advanced a similar theory—which emphasizes that idea of “high politics”—the great popular movements that seek to influence the decisions of the Supreme Court on issues like abortion or affirmative action. I can’t do justice to their theory here, but the idea is that the Supreme Court may be responding to democratic pressures when it makes the really big constitutional decisions.
Dissolving the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
So far, I’ve been discussing responses to the counter-majoritarian difficulty that operate within normative constitutional theory. There is another important line of attack, however. The counter-majoritarian difficulty rests on a positive (factual) assumption—that the Supreme Court does, in fact, act contrary to political majorities. Some political scientists have argued that this positive assumption is incorrect—that the Supreme Court rarely, if ever, acts contrary to the wishes of the dominant political faction. There could be many reasons for that—one of them being the Supreme Court’s awareness that if it were to buck Congress and the President, it is vulnerable to a variety of political reprisals. Congress might strip the Court of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the President might simply refuse to cooperate with Court’s decisions.
There is another side to this story. There may be reasons why elected politicians prefer for the Supreme Court to “take the heat” for some decisions that are controversial. When the Supreme Court acts, politicians may be able to say, “It wasn’t me. It was that darn Supreme Court.” And in fact, the Supreme Court’s involvement in some hot button issues may actually help political parties to mobilize their base: “Give us money, so that we can [confirm/defeat] the President’s nominee to the Supreme Court, who may cast the crucial vote on [abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, etc.].” In other words, what appears to be counter-majoritarian may actually have been welcomed by the political branches that, on the surface, appear to have been thwarted.
Conclusion
Once again, I’ve gone on for too long. I hope you will forgive me, and I hope that this Lexicon entry has given you food for thought about the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Below, I’ve included a list of references to articles that focus on the difficulty itself and also to some of the authors who have attempted to give answers to Bickel’s famous problem.
Related Lexicon Entries
Legal Theory Lexicon 046: Legitimacy
Resources on the Internet
Counter-majoritarian difficulty, Wikipedia.
References
This is a very incomplete list, emphasizing the works that are focused on “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” in particular and omitting many important works of constitutional theory that deal with the counter-majoritarian difficulty as part of a larger enterprise.
Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (1998).
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (2001).
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-18 (2d ed. 1986).
Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1373 (1998)
Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 933 (2001).
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333, 334 (1998).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court , 91 Geo. L.J. 1 (2002).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson Of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383 (2001).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000).
Barry Friedman, The Birth Of An Academic Obsession: The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002).
Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (1993).
Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1463, 1477-1486 (2009).
Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287 (2004).
Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 Harv. C.L.-C.R. L. Rev. 371 (2012).
Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1995).
(This entry was last revised on September 9, 2012.)
Legal Theory Lexicon: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
Introduction
The counter-majoritarian difficulty may be the best known problem in constitutional theory. The phrase is attributed to Alexander Bickel—a Yale Law School Professor—who is said to have introduced it in his famous book The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. Whatever Bickel actually meant by the phrase, it has now taken on a life of its own. The counter-majoritarian difficulty states a problem with the legitimacy of the institution of judicial review: when unelected judges use the power of judicial review to nullify the actions of electedexecutives or legislators, they act contrary to “majority will” as expressed by representative institutions. If one believes that democratic majoritarianism is a very great political value, then this feature of judicial review is problematic. For at least two or three decades after Bickel’s naming of this problem, it dominated constitutional theory.
This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon explores the counter-majoritarian difficulty, efforts to solve the problem and to dissolve it. As always, the Lexicon is aimed at law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory. As is frequently the case with the Lexicon, we will explore a very big topic in just a few paragraphs. Many articles and books have been written about the counter-majoritarian difficulty; we will only scratch its surface. Moreover, any really deep discussion of the counter-majoritarian difficulty would lead (sooner or later) to almost every other topic in constitutional theory. The Lexicon is “quick and dirty,” and definitely not deep, comprehensive, or authoritative.
Democracy and Majoritarianism
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is rooted in ideas about the relationship between democracy and legitimacy (see the Legal Theory Lexicon entry on Legitimacy ). We all know the basic story: the actions of government are legitimate because of their democratic pedigree, and democratic legitimacy requires “majority rule.” Of course, it isn’t that simple. Among the complexities are the following:
There are many different theories of democratic legitimacy, and only some of them emphasize “majoritarianism” as the key factor.
Some theories of democratic legitimacy rely on the idea of “consent of the governed,” but it is very difficult to mount an argument for actual consent to existing majoritarian institutions or their actions.
The idea of “legitimacy” is itself deeply controversial and might even be called obscure. What legitimacy is and why it is important are themselves deep and controversial questions.
Despite these complexities, most of us have a rough and ready appreciation for the idea that actions by democratic majorities have some kind of legitimacy that is lacking in the actions of unelected judges. At any rate, that idea is the normative foundation of the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Constitutional Limits on Majoritarianism
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is sometimes characterized as a problem with the institution of judicial review, but it could also be understood as a difficulty for any constitution that constrains majority will. Of course, there could be constitutions that impose no limits at all on the will of democratically elected legislatures. For example, a regime of unicameral parliamentary supremacy might be said to have a constitution that allows a parliamentary majority to pass any legislation that it pleases and to override the courts or executive whenever the legislature is in disagreement with their actions. Of course, even this simple constitution might constrain the legislature in a certain sense. Legislation that attempts to constrain the action of a future legislature might be “unconstitutional.” Another example might be legislation that abolishes elections and substitutes a system of self-perpetuating appointments. Similarly, a legislature might pass a “bill of rights” that purports to bind future legislatures, even in the absence of an institution of judicial review.
The Institution of Judicial Review
Even though the counter-majoritarian difficulty might be a feature of any system with a binding constitution, the difficulty is especially acute for a regime that incorporates the institution of judicial review incorporating judicial supremacy. In the United States, for example, the courts have the power to declare that acts of Congress are unconstitutional, and if the Supreme Court so declares, the Congress does not have the power to override its decision.
The institution of judicial review is counter-majoritarian in part because federal judges are not elected and they serve life terms. Presidents are elected every four years; members of the House of Representatives every two years; and Senators serve staggered six year terms. Of course, judges and justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and these features create some degree of democratic control of the judiciary. Nonetheless, on the surface, it certainly looks like judicial review is an antidemocratic institution. Unelected judges strike down legislation enacted by elected legislators: that is certainly antidemocratic and antimajoritarian in some sense.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty is compounded by the nature of judicial review as it has been practiced by the modern Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court limited itself to enforcing the separation of powers between the President and Congress or to the enforcement of the relatively determinate provisions of the constitution that establish the “rules of the game” for the political branches, then the counter-majoritarian difficulty might not amount to much. But the modern Supreme Court has been involved in the enforcement of constitutional provisions that general, abstract, and seemingly value laden—examples include the freedom of speech, the equal protection clause, and the due process clause of the constitution. The counter-majoritarian difficulty seems particularly acute when it comes to so-called “implied fundamental rights,” like the right to privacy at issue in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.
Judicial review in the United States includes judicial supremacy--the Supreme Court has the final say on the issues it decides, but this is not the only way that judicial review could be structured. In Canada, for example, provisions is made for a legislative override of the decisions striking down legislation. Such provisions ameliorate the counter-majoritarian difficulty, even if the override is rarely exercised, because they provide democratic control. Of course, even in the United States a Supreme Court decision can be overridden by a constitutional amendment, but that requires a supermajority.
Answering the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
How have constitutional theorists attempted to answer the counter-majoritarian difficulty? The problem with answer that question is that there are so many answers that it is difficult to single out three or four for illustrative purposes. So remember, the “answers” that are discussed here are arbitrary selections from a much longer list.
Discrete and Insular Minorities One famous answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty focuses on the idea of “discrete and insular minorities.” The background to this answer is the premise that in the long run, most individuals win some and lose some in the process of democratic decision making. Shifting coalitions among various interest groups “spread the wealth” and the pain—no one wins all the time or loses all the time. Or rather, normally wins and losses are spread across the many different groups that constitute a given political society. However, there may be some groups that are excluded from the give and take of democratic politics. Some groups may be so unpopular (or the victims of such extreme prejudice) that they almost always are the losers in the democratic process. The famous “Footnote Four” of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the Carolene Products case can serve as the germ of an answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Judicial review is arguably legitimate when it serves to protect the interests of “discrete and insular minorities” against oppressive actions by democratic majorities.
Anti-Democratic Political Theory Another answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty admits that judicial review is antidemocratic but seeks to justify this feature by appeal to some value that trumps democratic legitimacy. This isn’t really just one answer to the difficulty—it is a whole lot of answers that share a common feature—the appeal to anti-democratic political values. For example, it might be argued that “liberty” is a higher value than “democracy” and hence that judicial review to protect liberty is justified. Or it might be argued that “equality” is a higher value, or “privacy,” or something else. Obviously, there is a lot more to be said about this kind of answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, but for the purposes of this Lexicon entry, this incredibly terse explanation will have to suffice.
Dualism and High Politics Yet a third approach to the counter-majoritarian difficulty attempts to turn the problem upside down—arguing that judicial review is actually a democratic institution that checks the antidemocratic actions of elected officials. Whoa Nelly! How does that work? This third approach is strongly associated with the work of Bruce Ackerman—perhaps the most influential constitutional theorist since Alexander Bickel. Ackerman’s views deserve at least a whole Lexicon entry, but the gist of his theory can be stated briefly. Ackerman argues for a view that can be called “dualism,” because it distinguishes between two kinds of politics—“ordinary politics” (the kind practiced every day by legislators and bureaucrats) and “constitutional politics.” What is “constitutional politics”? And how is it different from “ordinary politics”? Ackerman’s answers to these questions begin with the idea that ordinary politics isn’t very democratic. Why not? We all know the answer to that question. Ordinary politics are dominated by self-interested politicians and manipulative special interest groups. The people (or “We the People” as Ackerman likes to say) don’t really get involved in ordinary politics, and therefore, ordinary politics are not really very democratic. Constitutional politics, by way of contrast, involve extraordinary issues that actually “get the attention” of the people. For example, the ratification of the Constitution of 1789 caught the attention of ordinary citizens, as did the Reconstruction Amendments (the 13th, 14th, and 15th) following the Civil War. When “We the People” become engaged in constitutional politics, we are giving commands to our agents—Congress and the President—and the Courts are merely enforcing our will when they engaged in judicial review—so long as they are faithful to our commands.
Ackerman’s theory emphasized the idea of distinct regimes that resulted from “constitutional moments”—periods of intense popular involvement in constitutional politics. Recently, Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have advanced a similar theory—which emphasizes that idea of “high politics”—the great popular movements that seek to influence the decisions of the Supreme Court on issues like abortion or affirmative action. I can’t do justice to their theory here, but the idea is that the Supreme Court may be responding to democratic pressures when it makes the really big constitutional decisions.
Dissolving the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
So far, I’ve been discussing responses to the counter-majoritarian difficulty that operate within normative constitutional theory. There is another important line of attack, however. The counter-majoritarian difficulty rests on a positive (factual) assumption—that the Supreme Court does, in fact, act contrary to political majorities. Some political scientists have argued that this positive assumption is incorrect—that the Supreme Court rarely, if ever, acts contrary to the wishes of the dominant political faction. There could be many reasons for that—one of them being the Supreme Court’s awareness that if it were to buck Congress and the President, it is vulnerable to a variety of political reprisals. Congress might strip the Court of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the President might simply refuse to cooperate with Court’s decisions.
There is another side to this story. There may be reasons why elected politicians prefer for the Supreme Court to “take the heat” for some decisions that are controversial. When the Supreme Court acts, politicians may be able to say, “It wasn’t me. It was that darn Supreme Court.” And in fact, the Supreme Court’s involvement in some hot button issues may actually help political parties to mobilize their base: “Give us money, so that we can [confirm/defeat] the President’s nominee to the Supreme Court, who may cast the crucial vote on [abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, etc.].” In other words, what appears to be counter-majoritarian may actually have been welcomed by the political branches that, on the surface, appear to have been thwarted.
Conclusion
Once again, I’ve gone on for too long. I hope you will forgive me, and I hope that this Lexicon entry has given you food for thought about the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Below, I’ve included a list of references to articles that focus on the difficulty itself and also to some of the authors who have attempted to give answers to Bickel’s famous problem.
Related Lexicon Entries
Legal Theory Lexicon 046: Legitimacy
Resources on the Internet
Counter-majoritarian difficulty, Wikipedia.
References
This is a very incomplete list, emphasizing the works that are focused on “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” in particular and omitting many important works of constitutional theory that deal with the counter-majoritarian difficulty as part of a larger enterprise.
Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (1998).
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (2001).
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 16-18 (2d ed. 1986).
Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1373 (1998)
Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 933 (2001).
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333, 334 (1998).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court , 91 Geo. L.J. 1 (2002).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson Of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1383 (2001).
Barry Friedman, The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000).
Barry Friedman, The Birth Of An Academic Obsession: The History Of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002).
Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (1993).
Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the Constitutional Imagination, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1463, 1477-1486 (2009).
Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287 (2004).
Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 Harv. C.L.-C.R. L. Rev. 371 (2012).
Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1995).
(This entry was last revised on September 9, 2012.)
quinta-feira, 6 de setembro de 2012
Obra de jurisprudência alemã
> http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/ComparativeConstitutions/~3/DUgiRQet3xY/the-german-constitutional-court-and.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email
quarta-feira, 5 de setembro de 2012
STF e questões
FSP 5 de setembro de 2012
STF enfrentará 4 questões sem consenso
Ministros divergem sobre pontos fundamentais do julgamento do mensalão, como o que fazer em caso de empate
Outros temas envolvem a perda automática do mandato na Câmara de réus condenados e o cálculo das penas
DE BRASÍLIA
O Supremo Tribunal Federal enfrentará, até o final do julgamento do mensalão, pelo menos quatro temas sem consenso entre os ministros.
O ministro-revisor, Ricardo Lewandowski, disse ontem que a corte ainda precisa definir as seguintes questões:
1. O que ocorre em caso de empate entre ministros?
2. A perda de mandato do réu condenado é automática ou depende de análise pela Câmara dos Deputados?
3. Quem votou pela absolvição deve opinar sobre o cálculo da pena?
4. Se houver divergência no cálculo, o que prevalecerá?
EMPATE
A possibilidade de empate aumentou com a aposentadoria do ministro Cezar Peluso, que deixou o Supremo com dez ministros.
Na avaliação da maioria deles, deve-se favorecer o réu com a absolvição. Mas há divergências. Marco Aurélio Mello defende que deve ser acompanhado o voto do presidente.
O presidente do STF, Carlos Ayres Britto, desconversou ontem, dizendo que não cogitava tal situação. "É uma pergunta sem resposta. Temos que interpretar corretamente o regimento."
PERDA DE MANDATO
Os ministros não adiantam posicionamento sobre a perda do cargo em caso de condenação dos réus com mandato como deputado federal.
No processo do mensalão, três réus -João Paulo Cunha (PT-SP), Pedro Henry (PP-MT) e Valdemar Costa Neto (PR-SP)- são deputados. O primeiro já foi condenado por corrupção passiva, peculato (desvio de dinheiro por servidor) e lavagem de dinheiro.
O único ministro que se pronunciou sobre o tema foi Peluso, que votou pela cassação automática do mandato.
A questão trouxe à tona divergências entre o procurador-geral da República, Roberto Gurgel, e o presidente da Câmara, Marco Maia (PT).
Enquanto Gurgel disse ontem que a Casa não pode manter no cargo um réu condenado, Maia afirmou que a palavra final é do Legislativo.
CÁLCULO DA PENA
As incertezas também chegam ao tamanho da punição aos condenados.
Alguns ministros avaliam que aqueles que votaram pela absolvição de um réu não podem participar da análise do cálculo da pena. Para outros, trata-se de uma questão formal em que todos devem apresentar suas opiniões.
Lewandowski integra o primeiro grupo: "Quem vota pela absolvição acha que a pessoa é inocente. Como vai depois estabelecer o cálculo? Não faz muito sentido."
O presidente Ayres Britto faz parte do segundo: "Aqueles que absolveram votarão pela pena mínima".
O ministro-revisor disse que é preciso debater um caso em que, por exemplo, um réu foi condenado por unanimidade, mas há divergência em relação à pena. Ou tira-se uma média dos votos ou decide-se pela punição mais favorável ao réu.
(FELIPE SELIGMAN, MÁRCIO FALCÃO, FLÁVIO FERREIRA, RUBENS VALENTE E NÁDIA GUERLENDA)
STF enfrentará 4 questões sem consenso
Ministros divergem sobre pontos fundamentais do julgamento do mensalão, como o que fazer em caso de empate
Outros temas envolvem a perda automática do mandato na Câmara de réus condenados e o cálculo das penas
DE BRASÍLIA
O Supremo Tribunal Federal enfrentará, até o final do julgamento do mensalão, pelo menos quatro temas sem consenso entre os ministros.
O ministro-revisor, Ricardo Lewandowski, disse ontem que a corte ainda precisa definir as seguintes questões:
1. O que ocorre em caso de empate entre ministros?
2. A perda de mandato do réu condenado é automática ou depende de análise pela Câmara dos Deputados?
3. Quem votou pela absolvição deve opinar sobre o cálculo da pena?
4. Se houver divergência no cálculo, o que prevalecerá?
EMPATE
A possibilidade de empate aumentou com a aposentadoria do ministro Cezar Peluso, que deixou o Supremo com dez ministros.
Na avaliação da maioria deles, deve-se favorecer o réu com a absolvição. Mas há divergências. Marco Aurélio Mello defende que deve ser acompanhado o voto do presidente.
O presidente do STF, Carlos Ayres Britto, desconversou ontem, dizendo que não cogitava tal situação. "É uma pergunta sem resposta. Temos que interpretar corretamente o regimento."
PERDA DE MANDATO
Os ministros não adiantam posicionamento sobre a perda do cargo em caso de condenação dos réus com mandato como deputado federal.
No processo do mensalão, três réus -João Paulo Cunha (PT-SP), Pedro Henry (PP-MT) e Valdemar Costa Neto (PR-SP)- são deputados. O primeiro já foi condenado por corrupção passiva, peculato (desvio de dinheiro por servidor) e lavagem de dinheiro.
O único ministro que se pronunciou sobre o tema foi Peluso, que votou pela cassação automática do mandato.
A questão trouxe à tona divergências entre o procurador-geral da República, Roberto Gurgel, e o presidente da Câmara, Marco Maia (PT).
Enquanto Gurgel disse ontem que a Casa não pode manter no cargo um réu condenado, Maia afirmou que a palavra final é do Legislativo.
CÁLCULO DA PENA
As incertezas também chegam ao tamanho da punição aos condenados.
Alguns ministros avaliam que aqueles que votaram pela absolvição de um réu não podem participar da análise do cálculo da pena. Para outros, trata-se de uma questão formal em que todos devem apresentar suas opiniões.
Lewandowski integra o primeiro grupo: "Quem vota pela absolvição acha que a pessoa é inocente. Como vai depois estabelecer o cálculo? Não faz muito sentido."
O presidente Ayres Britto faz parte do segundo: "Aqueles que absolveram votarão pela pena mínima".
O ministro-revisor disse que é preciso debater um caso em que, por exemplo, um réu foi condenado por unanimidade, mas há divergência em relação à pena. Ou tira-se uma média dos votos ou decide-se pela punição mais favorável ao réu.
(FELIPE SELIGMAN, MÁRCIO FALCÃO, FLÁVIO FERREIRA, RUBENS VALENTE E NÁDIA GUERLENDA)
domingo, 2 de setembro de 2012
São Paulo, domingo, 02 de setembro de 2012
FSP
STF define tratamento mais rigoroso contra a corrupção
Primeiro mês do julgamento estabelece teses com impacto em todo o Judiciário
Posições sobre atos de ofício e validade de provas colhidas por CPIs sugerem condenação da maioria dos réus do caso
DE BRASÍLIA
Iniciado há um mês, o julgamento do mensalão no STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal) já estabeleceu teses jurídicas que deverão levar à condenação da maioria dos réus do processo e sugerem que casos de corrupção terão um tratamento mais rigoroso no Judiciário daqui para frente.
A importância do caso faz com que as decisões passem a ser referência para toda a Justiça, já que essa é uma das raras vezes em que o Supremo, preponderantemente um tribunal constitucional, analisa fatos e provas penais.
Os ministros do Supremo julgaram até agora apenas o primeiro dos sete capítulos do mensalão. A conclusão é que o esquema de corrupção foi alimentado com dinheiro público, vindo da Câmara dos Deputados e principalmente do Banco do Brasil.
Mais do que isso, os ministros derrubaram boa parte das teses apresentadas pela defesa, fixando a base para futuras condenações.
Entre elas a de que é necessária a existência do chamado "ato de ofício" para que se configurasse a corrupção. A maioria dos ministros entendeu que basta o recebimento de propina para haver o crime, mesmo que o servidor não tenha praticado nenhum ato funcional em troca.
"Basta que o agente público que recebe a vantagem indevida tenha o poder de praticar atos de ofício", disse a ministra Rosa Weber.
Em outro dos pontos, só dois ministros aceitaram até agora um dos argumentos centrais dos réus, o de que o esquema se resumiu apenas a gasto eleitoral não declarado à Justiça -o caixa dois.
Segundo a acusação, o dinheiro foi usado para compra de apoio legislativo ao governo Lula em 2003 e 2004.
Os entendimentos adotados pelo STF são desfavoráveis aos réus políticos -integrantes de partidos governistas que receberam dinheiro, como Valdemar Costa Neto (PR), Pedro Henry (PP) e Roberto Jefferson (PTB), que revelou o esquema em entrevista à Folha em 2005.
Eles argumentaram que receberam dinheiro para gastos eleitorais ou partidários.
Mas para o ministro Celso de Mello, quando existe a corrupção, é "irrelevante" a destinação do dinheiro -tanto faz se foi usado "para satisfazer necessidades pessoais", "solver dívidas de campanhas" ou para "atos de benemerência".
Outra tese da defesa que deve ser derrotada -quatro ministros já se manifestaram contra- é a de que só devem ser consideradas válidas provas colhidas no processo judicial, quando há amplo espaço para a defesa dos réus.
A maior parte dos ministros indicou até agora que provas obtidas em CPIs, inquéritos policiais, reportagens de jornais e depoimentos só não valem quando constituírem o único fundamento da acusação. Dentro de um contexto, dão força ao processo criminal.
"Os indícios não merecem apoteose maior, mas não merecem a excomunhão. Não podemos alijar os indícios. [...] É uma visão conjunta", argumentou Marco Aurélio Mello.
Por fim, a maioria dos ministros também indicou que há crime de lavagem de dinheiro (tentativa de ocultar a origem de um recurso ilícito) quando um beneficiário envia outra pessoa para sacar o dinheiro em seu lugar.
O deputado João Paulo Cunha (PT) e o ex-diretor do Banco do Brasil Henrique Piz-zolato foram condenados por isso. Há outros réus que receberam dinheiro da mesma forma.
(FELIPE SELIGMAN, FLÁVIO FERREIRA, MÁRCIO FALCÃO, MATHEUS LEITÃO e RUBENS VALENTE)
FSP
STF define tratamento mais rigoroso contra a corrupção
Primeiro mês do julgamento estabelece teses com impacto em todo o Judiciário
Posições sobre atos de ofício e validade de provas colhidas por CPIs sugerem condenação da maioria dos réus do caso
DE BRASÍLIA
Iniciado há um mês, o julgamento do mensalão no STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal) já estabeleceu teses jurídicas que deverão levar à condenação da maioria dos réus do processo e sugerem que casos de corrupção terão um tratamento mais rigoroso no Judiciário daqui para frente.
A importância do caso faz com que as decisões passem a ser referência para toda a Justiça, já que essa é uma das raras vezes em que o Supremo, preponderantemente um tribunal constitucional, analisa fatos e provas penais.
Os ministros do Supremo julgaram até agora apenas o primeiro dos sete capítulos do mensalão. A conclusão é que o esquema de corrupção foi alimentado com dinheiro público, vindo da Câmara dos Deputados e principalmente do Banco do Brasil.
Mais do que isso, os ministros derrubaram boa parte das teses apresentadas pela defesa, fixando a base para futuras condenações.
Entre elas a de que é necessária a existência do chamado "ato de ofício" para que se configurasse a corrupção. A maioria dos ministros entendeu que basta o recebimento de propina para haver o crime, mesmo que o servidor não tenha praticado nenhum ato funcional em troca.
"Basta que o agente público que recebe a vantagem indevida tenha o poder de praticar atos de ofício", disse a ministra Rosa Weber.
Em outro dos pontos, só dois ministros aceitaram até agora um dos argumentos centrais dos réus, o de que o esquema se resumiu apenas a gasto eleitoral não declarado à Justiça -o caixa dois.
Segundo a acusação, o dinheiro foi usado para compra de apoio legislativo ao governo Lula em 2003 e 2004.
Os entendimentos adotados pelo STF são desfavoráveis aos réus políticos -integrantes de partidos governistas que receberam dinheiro, como Valdemar Costa Neto (PR), Pedro Henry (PP) e Roberto Jefferson (PTB), que revelou o esquema em entrevista à Folha em 2005.
Eles argumentaram que receberam dinheiro para gastos eleitorais ou partidários.
Mas para o ministro Celso de Mello, quando existe a corrupção, é "irrelevante" a destinação do dinheiro -tanto faz se foi usado "para satisfazer necessidades pessoais", "solver dívidas de campanhas" ou para "atos de benemerência".
Outra tese da defesa que deve ser derrotada -quatro ministros já se manifestaram contra- é a de que só devem ser consideradas válidas provas colhidas no processo judicial, quando há amplo espaço para a defesa dos réus.
A maior parte dos ministros indicou até agora que provas obtidas em CPIs, inquéritos policiais, reportagens de jornais e depoimentos só não valem quando constituírem o único fundamento da acusação. Dentro de um contexto, dão força ao processo criminal.
"Os indícios não merecem apoteose maior, mas não merecem a excomunhão. Não podemos alijar os indícios. [...] É uma visão conjunta", argumentou Marco Aurélio Mello.
Por fim, a maioria dos ministros também indicou que há crime de lavagem de dinheiro (tentativa de ocultar a origem de um recurso ilícito) quando um beneficiário envia outra pessoa para sacar o dinheiro em seu lugar.
O deputado João Paulo Cunha (PT) e o ex-diretor do Banco do Brasil Henrique Piz-zolato foram condenados por isso. Há outros réus que receberam dinheiro da mesma forma.
(FELIPE SELIGMAN, FLÁVIO FERREIRA, MÁRCIO FALCÃO, MATHEUS LEITÃO e RUBENS VALENTE)
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